Abstract: Recent studies have argued that the low voter turnout that accompanies off-cycle elections could create an advantage for interest groups. However, the endogeneity of election timing makes it difficult to estimate its causal effect on political outcomes. In this paper, I examine the effects of a 2006 Texas law that forced approximately 20 percent of the state"s school districts to move their elections to the same day as national elections. Using matching as well as district fixed effects regression, I estimate the causal effect of the switch to on-cycle election timing on average district teacher salary, since teachers and their unions tend to be the dominant interest group in school board elections. I find that school districts that were forced to switch to on-cycle elections responded by granting significantly lower salary raises to teachers, supporting the hypothesis that school trustees were less responsive to the dominant interest group after the switch.
1
The major danger in a light vote lies in the fact that highly organized groups, whether of the nature of old-fashioned city machines or of special interest groups of any type, will thereby be able to control the government, for the lighter the vote the easier it is for such groups to win. They have a solid nucleus of dependable voters. A small turnout does not result in the same percentage distribution of the vote among the various segments of the population as would be found in a large turnout (Adrian 1955, 72) .
It is well established that the timing of elections affects voter turnout. Average turnout in midterm congressional elections runs 13 percentage points lower than turnout in congressional elections held concurrently with presidential elections (Jacobson 2001) . Gubernatorial elections attract the most voters when they are held concurrently with presidential elections and the fewest voters when they are held in the odd-numbered years (Patterson and Caldeira 1983) . The effect is even more pronounced for local government. For example, when municipal elections are held separately from state and national elections, voter turnout averages over 30 percentage points lower than when they are held concurrently with presidential elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003) .
Scholars have long suspected that low voter turnout creates electoral advantages for organized groups (e.g., Adrian 1955) . However, in spite of the fact that securing off-cycle election timing is one of the most reliable ways to significantly lower turnout (e.g., Hajnal 2010), there is very little research that examines the link between the timing of elections and the extent to which interest groups can influence political and policy outcomes. This gap in the literature is notable, especially considering the number of governments in the U.S. that hold elections on days other than the Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even-numbered years: 80 percent of cities, the vast majority of school districts, and even a few U.S. states hold general elections at times other than national Election Day. Studies have established that far fewer voters participate in these elections than in comparable elections held concurrently with national elections (e.g., Caren 2007) , but until recently, there were no empirical tests of whether this lower turnout leads to systematic differences in election outcomes and policy.
The last year has seen some empirical investigation of the effects of election timing (Anzia 2011, Berry and Gersen 2011) , but like most studies that use observational data, they face challenges to establishing a causal link between off-cycle election timing, turnout bias, and interest group influence. First, there is potential for omitted variable bias. In cross-sectional analysis in particular, it is usually difficult to rule out the possibility that unobservable characteristics of the governmental units explain both the timing of their elections and the degree to which interest groups influence their political outcomes. Analysis of within-unit changes in election timing and political outcomes can reduce the incidence of omitted variable bias, but most longitudinal studies still confront the problem of selection bias: if interest groups lobby for off-cycle election scheduling in the units where they expect it to help them most, then by comparing units with off-cycle elections to units with on-cycle elections, one risks overestimating the causal effect of election timing.
In this paper, I take advantage of a policy intervention in Texas to overcome these empirical challenges and to develop a conservative causal estimate of the effect of election timing on public policy. Prior to 2006, the trustees of all 1,032 independent school districts in Texas had the authority to choose to hold elections on either the second Saturday in May or on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, and 99 percent of school districts used the May election date. In July 2006, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 1 (HB 1), which required all school districts in the state to combine their elections with either municipal elections -most of which are held in May -or county elections -all of which are held in November of evennumbered years. School districts that had incorporated municipalities within their borders were allowed to keep their off-cycle election schedules as long as those municipalities held off-cycle elections. However, at least 174 districts were forced to switch to on-cycle trustee elections as a result of HB 1, either because they contained no incorporated municipalities, or because the municipalities within their borders held elections in November of even-numbered years.
I estimate the effect of election timing by comparing the pre-and post-HB 1 policy outputs of two groups of districts: those that were forced to switch to on-cycle elections (treatment districts) and those that were allowed to retain off-cycle elections (control districts).
Since teacher unions tend to be the dominant interest group in school district elections (Hess and Leal 2005, Moe 2005 ), I use teacher salaries in the district to measure variation in interest group influence within and across school districts. First, I use matching to estimate the effect of the forced switch to on-cycle elections on teacher salary growth rates. I find that teacher salaries grew by approximately 0.75 percentage points less in treatment districts following implementation of HB 1 than in the matched control districts. Second, I model district teacher salaries using fixed effects regression, partialling out the effect of unobservable, time-invariant district characteristics. I find that relative to average annual changes in teacher salaries across the state, teacher salaries in treated districts were 1.3 percent lower following the switch to oncycle elections. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that school trustees were less responsive to the dominant interest group once they were forced to hold on-cycle elections.
Election Timing, Voter Turnout, and Interest Group Influence
Across the U.S., voter turnout varies considerably by the type of election: Turnout in presidential elections is higher than turnout in midterm congressional elections (Jacobson 2001) , turnout in primary elections tends to be lower than turnout in general elections (Ranney 1972) , and turnout in local government elections is usually much lower than turnout in state and national elections (Bridges 1997 , Weimer 2001 , Wood 2002 . However, when local elections are combined with state and national elections, turnout in local races is considerably higher (Aldrich 1993) . Hajnal and Lewis (2003) , for example, find that turnout in off-cycle city elections averages over 30 percentage points lower than in city elections held during presidential elections. Similarly, Hess (2002) finds that turnout in local school board elections tends to be much lower when they are not held concurrently with other elections.
The near-consensus in the American politics literature is that low voter turnout does little to affect election outcomes (e.g., Highton and Wolfinger 2001, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) , but almost all studies that draw such conclusions examine voters and nonvoters in presidential and congressional elections -when turnout is at its highest (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005) . By contrast, several studies that examine state and local elections find that turnout levels do have consequences for political representation and policy. Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) , for example, find that lower turnout works to reduce racial minority representation on city councils and in mayors" offices. Hill and Leighley (1992) find that low turnout in state elections leads to tax and welfare policies that favor the upper class. Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks (1997) argue that offcycle election timing in school bond referenda increases the proportion of "yes" voters who turn out to the polls, and Meredith (2009) provides evidence that agenda setters strategically schedule these referenda for on-cycle elections if high-turnout electorates are more likely to approve the bonds. Furthermore, Berry (2009) suggests that the reduced voter turnout of off-cycle elections increases the proportion of high demanders at the polls in special district elections.
In an earlier paper (Anzia 2011) , I built on this literature and argued that off-cycle election timing increases the influence of organized interest groups in elections. That advantage works through two channels. The first channel is based on the notion that individuals who have an immediate stake in the outcome of an election are more likely to participate in that election than individuals who have less at stake Hansen 1993, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) , and, moreover, that many individuals who have a large stake in politics are members of special interest groups (e.g., Fiorina 1999 ). The logic is simple: When an election is shifted from on-cycle to off-cycle, overall voter turnout decreases. However, the people with a large stake in the election outcome participate at high rates regardless of when the election is held, and thus the decrease in turnout comes disproportionately from those who have less at stake. Purely on the basis of their individual incentives, then, the members of interest groups whose central policy issues are the responsibility of officials chosen in the election cast a greater proportion of the ballots when the election is held off-cycle as opposed to on-cycle. Second, off-cycle election timing enhances the effectiveness of interest groups" mobilization efforts. Specifically, organized interest groups can take advantage of the lower turnout that comes with off-cycle election timing by targeting potential supporters and encouraging them to participate. When turnout is low, each supportive voter mobilized by the interest group is more important to the outcome than she would be in an on-cycle election. Thus, if a group mobilizes the same number of voters in an off-cycle election as it would in an on-cycle election, those voters make up a greater proportion of the electorate in the off-cycle context. Ultimately, the consequences of off-cycle election timing for election outcomes and policy depend on the types of policies at stake and the dynamics of interest group activity. The most straightforward scenario is one in which an interest group seeks a policy for which benefits are concentrated (among group members), costs are diffuse, and over which the group faces little to no organized competition.
2 In such a setting, a shift from on-cycle to off-cycle election timing 1 Of course, some policy "stakeholders" may not be members of interest groups, and they would also be expected to have greater presence in off-cycle elections. 2 As Wilson (1995, 331-337) argues, it is precisely the policy areas where benefits are concentrated and costs are distributed where one is likely to find highly organized beneficiaries facing little to no organized competition. The same is true when a policy has concentrated costs and distributed benefits: those who stand to pay the costs tend to be more motivated and better organized than the beneficiaries.
should suppress voter turnout more among those who stand to bear the cost of the policy than among the beneficiaries, producing an electorate with a median voter more favorable to the interest group"s policy position (Dunne et al. 1997) . Moreover, off-cycle election timing in such a context would enhance the effectiveness of the group"s mobilization efforts without also aiding any opposition group. For both of these reasons, the electorate as a whole should be more favorably disposed toward the group"s policy goals in off-cycle elections.
As a result, officials elected in off-cycle elections should be more responsive to the organized group than officials elected in on-cycle elections. Strictly speaking, this difference in responsiveness could occur in two ways: First, in off-cycle elections, the interest group could have greater success in replacing incumbents who are unfriendly to their goals with new, more supportive elected officials. Alternatively, a shift to off-cycle election timing could induce sitting elected officials to be more responsive to the interest group if those officials expect that the group will suddenly be more important to their reelection efforts. Regardless of whether the interest group succeeds in replacing incumbents or inducing incumbents to be responsive (or both), however, the policy prediction is the same: policy should be more favorable to the group when elections are held off-cycle than when they are held on-cycle.
Of course, not all interest groups seek policies with concentrated benefits and distributed costs. If the policy issue at stake is one where voters on both sides are highly motivated to participate, the individual-level effect of off-cycle election timing might result in little to no change to election outcomes. It is even possible that on-cycle electorates could be more favorable to a group"s policy position (Meredith 2009 ). For example, in an environment where pro-choice voters are more highly motivated to participate than pro-life voters, a pro-life group might actually fare better when turnout is high. In the most general sense, then, a group benefits from off-cycle election timing if its members and supporters are more likely to weather the overall decrease in voter turnout than the eligible voters who oppose the group"s policy goals.
Also, when two organized groups compete over policy, the group-level effect of off-cycle election timing cannot create advantages for both groups simultaneously. In such cases, offcycle election timing increases the importance of both groups" mobilization efforts, but it is the group with greater organizational capacity -meaning greater ability to mobilize supporters (e.g., more financial resources or more volunteers) -that should see policy shift in its favor as a result.
It is more difficult to make predictions about how election timing will affect political outcomes when individuals on both sides of an issue are highly motivated to turn out, or when two or more groups compete over policy, but election timing still has great potential to tip the balance of power between them. An example helps to illustrate. 3 Consider a scenario in which two organized groups, the Developers and the Environmentalists, are at odds over land-use policy. Each group nominates a candidate for the upcoming city election and seeks to maximize the vote share received by that candidate. The question is: which candidate wins greater vote share when the election is held off-cycle rather than on the same day as a presidential election?
If the Developers have greater organizational capacity than the Environmentalists, then on the basis of the group-level effect alone, the Developers" candidate stands to win greater vote share in an off-cycle election than in an on-cycle election. 4 However, separating the city election from the presidential election also demobilizes voters whose interests lie primarily in the highly However, if the Developers" members are sufficiently less enthusiastic about the land-use issue than the Environmentalists, the Developers" candidate could win a larger percentage of the vote in an on-cycle election. In this way, the individual-and group-level effects of off-cycle election timing can pull in opposite directions, and the net impact of election timing on the candidates" vote shares depends on which of the two countervailing forces is stronger. Table 1 , the net effect of off-cycle election timing depends on which of the two countervailing forces is stronger.
[ Table 1 about here]
Thus, even when groups seek policies that do not have concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, or when groups work at cross-purposes, changes to election timing still have potential to tip the balance of power in favor of one group or its rival. Notably, however, the theory"s prediction is clearest when a group"s members are more highly motivated to participate than their rivals and when the group faces relatively weak organized competition.
Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on just such a context -a context in which one group tends to be more motivated and better organized than its opposition: school board elections. Teachers and other school district employees have greater incentive to participate in school board elections than the average eligible voter, since by getting involved in school board elections, district employees can help to select the very people who set their salaries, benefits, and working conditions (Moe 2006) . Also, of the groups that tend to be active in school board elections, teachers and their unions are the most consistent: In a nationwide survey of school board members, Hess (2002) and Hess and Leal (2005) (Haar 2002 , Lieberman 1997 , Moe 2005 . The main potential rivals to teacher groups -business groups -are less frequently active (Hess and Leal 2005) , and besides, education is only one of the policy areas that they might focus on, whereas for teachers, it is the focus (Moe 2005) .
Furthermore, teacher unions across the country share many of the same policy goals, which simplifies the task of identifying a dependent variable. Notably, one of the main goals of teacher unions is to secure higher compensation for teachers. 5 Since teacher compensation is largely determined by the board members who are elected in school district elections, we can expect it to fluctuate within and across districts depending on how influential teachers are in those elections. Consequently, if off-cycle elections allow teachers to have greater influence than on-cycle elections, school board members in districts with off-cycle elections should better compensate teachers than board members in comparable districts with on-cycle elections.
Challenges for Causal Inference
A comparative study of teacher compensation in school districts with on-cycle and offcycle elections must also address the concern that election schedules are not randomly assigned to school districts. Rather, for most states in the U.S., school board election timing is uniform within states, as mandated by the state government (Anzia 2011 union strength -make it more or less likely to adopt a certain election schedule and influence its teacher compensation policies, estimates of the effect of election timing will be biased.
The situation is improved if one can leverage within-district changes in election timing to estimate the effect, which is the general approach taken by Berry and Gersen (2011) . If, for example, teacher union strength is constant over the time period being examined, then a longitudinal model with school district fixed effects would eliminate teacher union strength as a potential source of omitted variable bias. But even in such a district fixed effects model, the possibility of selection bias remains. If teachers only lobby for off-cycle election timing in the districts where they think they will benefit from it, then by simply comparing districts where they secured off-cycle election timing to those where they did not make the effort, one would overestimate the average effect of off-cycle election timing. Since most within-district changes in election timing are the result of decisions made by elected officials within the district itself, it is possible that the officials who chose to alter election timing did so precisely because they anticipated that it would have certain effects on the size and composition of the electorate. The problem this poses to causal inference is this: if officials in one district change elections to offcycle while officials in another district opt for a continuation of on-cycle elections, we might not expect officials in those districts to make similar policy decisions, even in the absence of changes to election timing.
The empirical design I use in this paper takes advantage of a 2006 Texas state law that forced some Texas school districts to move their elections to on-cycle while allowing others to retain their pre-existing off-cycle election schedules. By examining changes within districts over time, I largely overcome the problem of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, since the rule the state used to assign school districts to on-cycle or off-cycle schedules was objective, teachers and administrators in districts forced to on-cycle elections were unable to alter the mandate. Thus, the design reduces the incidence of selection bias. November of even-numbered years, those school districts had to combine elections with the counties. Therefore, with the passage of HB 1, several Texas school districts were forced to shift trustee elections to the same day as presidential elections and gubernatorial elections. Type 1 districts: School districts that have an incorporated municipality within district boundaries, and that municipality holds elections in May. These school districts had the option of either having a joint election with the municipality in May (off-cycle) or having a joint election with the county in November of even-numbered years (on-cycle).
A Quasi-Experiment: Texas House Bill 1
Type 2 districts: School districts that have a municipality within district boundaries, and that municipality holds elections in November of odd-numbered years. These districts had the option of either holding a joint election with the municipality in November of odd-numbered years (offcycle) or with the county in November of even-numbered years (on-cycle).
Type 3 districts: School districts that have a municipality within district boundaries, and that municipality has elections in November of even-numbered years. These districts were forced to move their elections to November of even-numbered years (on-cycle).
Type 4 districts: School districts that do not have an incorporated municipality within district boundaries. These districts were forced to combine elections with the counties in November of even-numbered years (on-cycle).
For the empirical analysis, I take advantage of the fact that a large number of Texas school districts had no choice but to hold on-cycle elections after 2006, whereas other districts maintained discretion over whether to conduct on-cycle or off-cycle elections. The former group, composed of type 3 and type 4 districts, makes up the treatment group, and the latter set of districts, including type 1 and type 2 districts, makes up the control group. My key design innovation is that the school trustees in type 3 and type 4 districts had no choice but to move to on-cycle elections, which meant that interest groups in those districts could not lobby for an advantageous school trustee election schedule. Moreover, the assignment of districts to treatment and control conditions was purely a function of whether or not the school district had a municipality within its borders and when that municipality held its elections. Importantly, assignment was not explicitly a function of interest group strength in the district.
That said, the assignment rule established by HB 1 was created only after Texas
Republicans tried for two years -unsuccessfully -to move all school trustee elections in Texas In response to the testimony of the opposition, Texas Rep. Dan Gattis replied:
"I think it"s a little disingenuous at times to say, "We want to make sure that we have informed voters." No you don"t. You want to make sure that you have your votersyour voters that are going to come and vote for your issue…They mean the voters that they know they can turn out to vote for their deal."
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HB 855 was eventually dropped, and subsequent bills that proposed moving all trustee elections to November of even-numbered years were quietly snuffed in committee. The joint election provision that was later slipped into HB 1 in the summer of 2006 was a watered down election timing measure that only affected the elections of 20 percent of school districts in the state. State teacher unions and school board representatives testified against HB 1 in committee hearings, but the bill was first and foremost a bill that provided property tax relief and created new fiscal and academic accountability programs for school districts, so testimony did not focus on the election timing provision. attempts to force larger numbers of districts to on-cycle elections, but those attempts failed to gain traction in the legislature.
In sum, HB 1 created a rule for assigning districts to treatment and control conditions that applied uniformly to all 1,032 independent school districts throughout the state. Importantly, though, the creation of that rule in the legislature was likely the result of concessions made to the teacher unions and school trustees who opposed the move to on-cycle elections. Furthermore, even though the rule for assigning districts to treatment and control conditions was objective, it was not necessarily orthogonal to district attributes that were correlated with district teacher compensation. For example, since larger and more urban districts are more likely to have strong unions and to overlap with incorporated municipalities, the political clout of teachers might be greater in control districts than in the districts forced to on-cycle elections. To account for these differences between treatment and control districts, I use both matching techniques -which address selection on observable district characteristics -and fixed effects regression -which also addresses selection on time-invariant unobservable district characteristics -to estimate the effect of election timing on teacher salaries. I describe both strategies in the following sections.
School Board Elections and Teachers in Texas
Since my empirical analysis focuses on a single state, it is also important to evaluate whether Texas is a suitable testing ground for studying teacher influence in school elections.
For starters, Texas is different from most states outside the South in that it prohibits collective bargaining for public school teachers. In one key respect, this difference is helpful for the empirical analysis: School board members in districts with collective bargaining are bound by contracts that typically remain in place for three years, and so even if election timing changes, school boards might not be able to change teacher compensation levels until the existing contract expires. In Texas, however, school boards can change teacher salaries every year. Thus, I can look for changes in teacher compensation levels immediately following the treatment.
Still, because the state prohibits collective bargaining for teachers, the rate of teacher union membership in Texas is not as high as in states like California. However, that is not to say that the rate of teacher union membership in Texas is low. To the contrary, a full 65 percent of public school teachers in Texas are members of unions (Moe 2011) . Moreover, it does not appear that teacher unionization in Texas is limited to large urban districts: I assembled data on Moreover, teacher unions are present in at least 95% of the districts. 13 Thus, even without collective bargaining, it seems that a majority of Texas teachers are members of unions.
Of course, without a study of school board politics specific to Texas, I cannot know for sure whether teachers are as politically active in Texas as they are elsewhere. As of now, the only existing studies of teacher and teacher union participation in school board elections have either been conducted in California (Moe 2005 (Moe , 2006 or using a national sample of districts (Hess and Leal 2005) . However, there is good reason to expect that teachers in Texas would be politically active in school board elections. Like everywhere else, school trustees in Texas set policies that directly affect the lives of teachers. It is therefore in the interest of teachers to help elect school trustees who will make teacher-friendly policies. And while Texas school board politics may feature groups that could be competitors of teachers -such as business or anti-tax groups -those competitors are interested in many different policy areas -not just education. 13 The details of how I calculated these figures are described in the online appendix.
Thus, to the extent that teachers in Texas face organized competition over teacher compensation policies, that competition is probably inconsistent and relatively weak in comparison.
With that said, the main advantage of focusing the empirical analysis on Texas is that its state legislature passed HB 1. State legislatures very rarely pass measures that change school district election timing, and so the Texas case presents an unusual opportunity for a clean empirical study using observational data.
Data
Since no state-level entity kept track of how each Texas school district was affected by the law, I employed a combination of strategies to classify the districts in the state as one of the four types described above. To create an exhaustive list of type 4 districts, I overlayed a shapefile of the boundaries of the 1,211 incorporated municipalities in Texas onto a shapefile of the boundaries of 1,023 Texas school districts. 14 I then used the intersect feature of ArcGIS to identify all areas of intersection between the independent school districts and incorporated municipalities, which enabled me to identify 150 independent school districts that do not overlap with any part of an incorporated municipality. These 150 districts form the comprehensive set of type 4 districts, which were all forced to switch to on-cycle elections following HB 1.
Type 3 districts also belong in the treatment group, but distinguishing type 3 districts from types 1 and 2 is challenging, because Texas does not have a central source of information on when municipal elections throughout the state are conducted. Therefore, I am unable to 14 The 2008-09 school district boundaries shapefile is from the Texas Education Agency (TEA). The geographic information was collected by the GIS Staff of the Research Division of the Texas Legislative Council. There are 1,032 independent school districts in Texas according to the TEA directory of school districts for 2008-09, but there are only 1,029 districts in the shapefile, and 6 of them are common school districts. Since the HB 1 elections rule did not explicitly apply to common school districts, I exclude them from the analysis. Therefore, with 1,023 independent school districts in the shapefile, I lack data on 9 independent school districts. [ Figure 1 about here]
Moreover, as expected, voter turnout increased significantly in districts that shifted to oncycle elections. Table 2 presents the results of two regressions of voter turnout on district and year fixed effects and an indicator for on-cycle election timing. The dependent variable in 20 While incumbent defeat rates in school board elections tend to be low, they are higher than in U.S. House races (Berry and Howell 2007, Hess and Leal 2005) , which suggests that sitting school board members often cannot safely ignore the policy pressure of organized groups in the electorate. Moreover, in California, Moe (2006) finds that teacher union endorsements are just as important to school board candidate success as incumbency. 21 After HB 1 became law in 2006, it was unclear to officials in many affected districts whether they were required to change term lengths in order to comply with the joint elections rule. column (1) is voter turnout as a percentage of adults in the district. 22 The results show that the average effect of switching to on-cycle elections was a 16 percentage point increase in voter turnout in the school board election. When I limit the analysis to the 14 districts for which I can calculate voter turnout as a percentage of registered voters, 23 as I do in column (2), the estimated coefficient on the on-cycle indicator is even larger -about 18 percentage points. Based on this analysis of a subset of districts, then, it is safe to assume that voter turnout increased in treatment districts as a result of the change to on-cycle elections.
[ Table 2 about here]
However, treatment districts differ from control districts on the basis of some districtlevel attributes that tend to be associated with both teacher salaries and the political strength of teachers in the district. For example, only 31 percent of the districts assigned to the treatment group are urban or urban fringe districts, whereas 49 percent of control districts are classified as urban or urban fringe. Since urban districts generally pay higher teacher salaries than rural districts and tend to have stronger teacher unions, failure to account for these differences would result in biased estimates of the treatment effect.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In addition, treatment districts tend to be smaller in size and slightly less affluent than control districts, and they also paid lower average teacher salaries in the pre-treatment period. I show these differences in Figure 2 . In the top two rows of the left-hand column, I plot the distributions of logged district enrollment in 2005 and logged median family income in 2000 for 22 The denominator is the number of adults in the district as of the 2000 Census. Three of the 31 school districts in this dataset conduct school board elections by electoral district, and since I do not have the Census figures broken down at the level of the school electoral district, I exclude those districts from the regression in column (1). Some districts that held at-large elections did not track the number of unique voters who participated in the school board elections, and in those cases, I estimated the number of ballots cast by dividing the total number of votes cast in the election by the number of positions up for election. 23 Specifically, only 14 districts supplied the number of registered voters in the district for each election.
treatment and control districts. 24 The distribution of enrollment for treatment districts is clearly shifted to the left of the distribution for control districts. Moreover, due to the presence of a few control districts with extremely high values of median family income, income in treatment districts tends to be lower than in control districts. In addition, as the plot in the top right-hand corner shows, logged average teacher salaries in 2003 were slightly lower in treatment districts than in control districts. These differences between treatment and control districts pose a problem for the empirical analysis: Regardless of election timing, larger districts tend to have stronger teacher unions. Larger and more affluent districts also tend to pay higher teacher salaries than smaller, less affluent districts. And if treatment districts were starting out with slightly lower average teacher salaries even before the treatment, there might be something distinct about those districts that affected their salary growth after 2006.
Regarding other attributes that are likely correlated with teachers" political strength and average teacher salaries, the pretreatment values for treatment and control districts are similar.
For example, teachers employed in more challenging work environments -for example, districts with more students for whom English is a second language -generally earn higher salaries that teachers who work in less challenging environments (see Martin 2010 ). Yet, as we can see from and urban fringe districts. In order to achieve balance on district enrollment and income, I use a caliper equal to one-tenth of a standard deviation for both variables, discarding all treatment districts that fail to find acceptable matches based on this distance criterion. 26 The dependent variable is the percentage growth in district average teacher salary (in real terms) from 2006-07 to 2009-10, the period following the implementation of HB 1. All matching is one-to-one with replacement and is carried out using the Matching package in R (Sekhon 2011).
To provide a benchmark, the first panel of Table 3 presents the results when I use all the treatment and control districts to calculate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
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Prior to carrying out any matching, I estimate a treatment effect of about -1 percentage point:
districts that were forced to switch to on-cycle elections increased salaries by 1 percentage point less than districts that kept their May elections. This difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, the treatment and control groups are not balanced on enrollment, income, the percentage of students who are African American, or pretreatment salary level. 25 In addition, treatment districts were no more likely to offer medical insurance or retirement benefits to their teachers, and they were less likely to offer dental and life insurance benefits. See online appendix. 26 For all larger calipers that I tried, I did not achieve balance on either district enrollment or district median income. See online appendix for details. 27 The number of control districts in this case is 742 instead of 743 because the TEA data are missing an average salary value for one district in 2006.
Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, which tests for differences in the overall distributions of a variable in two groups, I also reject that the distributions of percent Hispanic and percent Native American are the same in the treatment group as in the control group. I do, however, find that there is no difference between the rates of average teacher salary growth in treatment and control districts prior to the implementation of HB 1. Therefore, whereas treatment and control districts had statistically indistinguishable teacher salary growth rates prior to HB 1, after the election timing change was implemented, treatment districts increased salaries 1 percentage point less than control districts.
[ Table 3 about here]
The lower half of panel 2 of Table 3 presents the same balance statistics after I carry out the matching procedure described above. I successfully match 106 treatment districts to 88 unique control districts and achieve balance on all of the critical covariates. Specifically, using the matched subset of districts, for enrollment, income, student demographics, and pretreatment salary, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average treatment group values are equal to the average control group values. In addition, a K-S test fails to reject the null hypothesis for enrollment, income, district demographics, and pretreatment salary, demonstrating that the distributions within matched treatment and control districts on those variables are exchangeable.
As before the matching procedure, I find no significant differences between the means and distributions of average teacher salary growth in treatment and control districts prior to HB 1.
Using this comparable set of 194 districts, I estimate a treatment effect of -0.75 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10 percent level (p=.06). On average, therefore, districts that were forced to switch to on-cycle school trustee elections increased their teachers" salaries by 0.75 percentage points less following HB 1 than a set of districts of the same size, income, urbanicity, and pretreatment salary that were allowed to keep their off-cycle elections in
May. This result supports the hypothesis that the dominant interest group in school district elections exerts less influence in on-cycle elections than in off-cycle elections.
To ensure that the result in panel 2 is not driven by the inclusion of the small number of type 3 districts in the treatment group, I present in panel 3 the results from the same analysis but excluding type 3 districts. Recall that type 3 districts are those that have incorporated municipalities within their borders but that were nonetheless forced to switch to on-cycle elections because those municipalities hold elections in November of even-numbered years. If there is some unobserved property of districts whose municipalities hold on-cycle elections that makes them different from control districts whose municipalities hold off-cycle elections, then the two types of districts would not be exchangeable. However, when I exclude the type 3 districts from the analysis, 28 the effect of the forced switch to on-cycle school trustee elections decreases by a mere tenth of a percentage point: I still estimate a -0.63 percentage point effect of on-cycle election timing on average district teacher salary, significant at the 5 percent level.
The results from the matching analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that teachers are less influential in on-cycle elections. However, the matching only accounts for potential confounders that are observable. One might be concerned that there are unobservable characteristics of treatment districts that not only differ from those of control districts but that also determine why their teacher salaries increased at lower rates after 2006. For example, the residents of type 3 and type 4 districts might place lower priority on education spending than residents of type 1 and type 2 districts such that they responded to the economic downturn by granting lower salary raises to teachers. The estimates in Table 3 do not account for treatment and control group differences in residents" preferences over spending on teacher salariesmeasures of which do not exist -and therefore cannot rule out this possibility. Furthermore, certain characteristics of districts that influence whether or not they contain an incorporated municipality, such as the political influence of private developers or population density (see Burns 1994) , might also influence the way districts set teacher salary policy after 2006.
In order to account for potential differences between treatment and control districts such as district preferences and propensity to incorporate, I model within-district changes in average teacher salary from 2003-4 to 2009-10 using district fixed effects regression. This approach allows me to estimate the effect of the forced switch to on-cycle elections while partialling out the effects of any time-invariant district characteristics. The model is as follows:
Subscript i denotes the school district, and t denotes the year. On Cycle it is the primary independent variable of interest. It equals 1 for all treatment districts from 2007-08 to and 0 otherwise. The α i are district fixed effects, and X it is a matrix of district characteristics that vary year to year. The δ t are year dummy variables, which control for annual statewide trends in logged average teacher salaries (in real terms). β and ψ are regression coefficients, and ε it is an error term. Because the errors are likely correlated within districts over time, I cluster the standard errors by school district (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) .
The inclusion of district fixed effects allows me to partial out the effects of any unobservable district characteristics that do not vary over time, but there are several time-variant district characteristics that likely affect yearly changes in district teacher salary policies. To this end, I have collected data on a number of school district characteristics that I expect to influence both teacher salaries as well as whether a district fell into the treatment group or control group with the passage of HB 1. I assembled annual data on district enrollment using the NCES CCD files from 2003-04 to 2007-08 as well as TEA enrollment records for 2008-09 and 2009-10, since teacher salaries generally grow as districts increase in size. Teacher salaries also increase with district income, but data on median family income are only available at the school district level for years in which the decennial census is conducted. As a substitute, I use the annual TEA data on total assessed property value in each district to control for increases in district income over time. Because the dependent variable is average teacher salary, and more experienced teachers are paid higher salaries than less experienced teachers, I use TEA data on the average number of years of teacher experience in each district and year to control for seniority. 29 Lastly, since teachers who work in districts with more minority students tend to earn higher salaries The results of the fixed effects regression are presented in Table 4 . 30 The first column presents a simple model that includes only On Cycle, the district fixed effects, and the year dummy variables on the right hand side. The result is similar in magnitude to that of the results in Table 3 : relative to annual changes in average teacher salary throughout Texas, districts in the treatment group paid teachers 0.9 percent less in base salary once they were forced to conduct on-cycle elections. The estimate of the coefficient on On Cycle is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, lending support to the hypothesis.
[ Table 4 about here] 29 The teacher experience figures track how long a given teacher has been working for the Texas public school system, not the number of years he has been in a particular position. 30 The number of observations in column (1) is 6418 rather than 6419 (917 districts x 7 years) due to missing average teacher salary data for one district in 2006. In addition, I am missing property values data for 11 district-years, which explains the N in column (2).
In column (2), I add the full set of control variables, including logged enrollment, logged assessed property value, average teacher experience in the district, and the ethnic composition of the district. The result is striking: once treatment districts were forced to consolidate their elections with national elections in November of even-numbered years, the school trustees in those districts granted teachers significantly smaller salary increases than they had given in earlier years. Specifically, relative to annual trends in average salary throughout the state, treatment districts paid teachers 1.3 percent less after implementation of HB 1. 1.3 percent of the average teacher salary in the average district in 2007 amounted to $560, a non-negligible amount of money for an individual who makes $43,000 per year in base salary. Moreover, the effect of on-cycle election timing is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result provides strong support for the prediction that the switch to on-cycle election timing decreased the influence of teachers in the elections.
The other independent variables behave as expected. Enrollment is positively correlated with average district teacher salary: a 1 percent increase in enrollment is associated with a 0.03 percent increase in average teacher salary. Likewise, rising property values are associated with increases in average district teacher salaries, as expected. As the average number of years of teacher experience in a district increases, teacher salaries rise as well, an effect that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. While the proportion of students who are Native American or Asian does not appear to affect average teacher salaries, increasing proportions of African American and Hispanic students are associated with higher average teacher salaries.
In the model presented in column (3), I investigate the timing of the effect of on-cycle elections on average teacher salaries by including interactions between the treatment district indicator and all of the year dummy variables. Notably, there was no significant difference between the annual increases in average teacher salaries in treatment and control districts for 2003-4 to 2006-7, prior to HB 1: the coefficients on the interaction terms for all pre-treatment years are statistically insignificant. In 2007-8, however, while teacher salaries were lowered from 2006 levels (in real terms) in both treatment and control districts, the dip was significantly more pronounced in treatment districts. That trend continued in 2008-9, when the gap between treatment and control districts widened further. In 2009-10, the difference in growth between treatment and control districts slowed, and both increased average teacher salary by approximately 2 percent. The finding that there was a negative effect in the years between the announcement of the election timing change and the first on-cycle election suggests that sitting school board members became less responsive to teachers as a result of the switch.
31
The results presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 are robust to a variety of alterations in the district sample and model specification. 32 When I limit the analysis to the set of 194 matched districts, I estimate an effect of -0.7 percent, significant at the 10 percent level. The results are robust to the exclusion of type 3 districts, the exclusion of districts that pay the state minimum salary schedule, as well as to the inclusion (as control districts) of districts that I was not able to classify as treatment or control. When I use first differences rather than fixed effects regression, the effect is still negative and statistically significant. Finally, a battery of tests suggests that the results are not driven by fluctuation in teacher seniority over time, nor are they caused by differential effects of property tax reduction in treatment and control districts.
Moreover, it does not appear that the negative effect of on-cycle election timing is a product of within-district variation in teacher salaries. When I model specific steps of the salary 31 With more detailed information on the school trustee candidates running in each election, one could conduct a better test of the alternative "replacement" hypothesis. In the absence of such information, my findings suggest that the election timing change induced sitting trustees to be less responsive to teachers. 32 All the results described here are presented in the online appendix.
schedule for a subset of districts and years -thus comparing salaries for teachers with equal levels of education and experience -the negative impact of on-cycle election timing persists.
33
One might also worry that the negative effect on salaries could have been offset by increases in other, unmeasured components of teacher compensation, such as health insurance. However, my
analysis of NCES expenditures data shows that the switch to on-cycle elections had no discernable effect on districts" expenditures on instructional employees" fringe benefits.
On the whole, then, these results strongly support the hypothesis that the forced switch to on-cycle elections decreased the influence of teachers and teacher unions in Texas school board elections. However, if there were similar decreases in spending in areas not coveted by teachers, one might hesitate to attribute the change in average teacher salary to decreased teacher electoral influence caused by on-cycle elections.
34
One way of addressing concern about the mechanism would be to measure teacher electoral influence directly, perhaps by the percentage of voters mobilized by teacher organizations as a fraction of total active voters. Given that measures of teacher mobilization capacity are not available, one proxy for teacher mobilization strength is the percentage of teachers in a district who are members of unions. If unionization rates capture teacher organizational capacity, then the negative effect of On Cycle should be greater in more heavily unionized districts.
Even unionization, however, is hard to measure: there are no current, publicly available data on teacher union membership in all Texas school districts. As I explained above, it is possible to produce rough estimates of teacher union membership in a subset of districts using 33 The salary schedule data were provided by TASB for a subset of districts in 2003, 2006, and 2009 ; the results are in the online appendix. 34 Notably, the shift to on-cycle elections did not result in a significant decrease in total district spending. In a model of logged current expenditures on elementary and secondary education, the coefficient on On Cycle is negative but statistically insignificant. See online appendix.
the SASS data. For teacher unionization data on all school districts, however, the best available resource is the Census of Government from 1987 -the most recent year that the Census conducted its labor-management relations survey. Admittedly, this 20-year-old measure is a crude proxy for unionization rates today. Still, since it is the only available source for information on all of the districts, I use it to test whether the effect of the switch to on-cycle elections was larger (more negative) in more heavily unionized districts.
I interact the On
Cycle indicator with the unionization rate, centered about its mean, to test whether the shift to on-cycle elections had a greater impact in districts with better organized teachers.
The results are presented in column (4) of Table 4 . For districts with the mean level of teacher unionization in Texas in 1987, I estimate a statistically significant effect of on-cycle election timing of -1.3 percent. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term shows that the effect of the switch to on-cycle elections was more pronounced for districts in which a greater proportion of teachers were unionized. Granted, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is imprecise (p=0.106), and given the measurement error in the unionization variable, I do not put much stock in this result. 36 However, when I run the same regression on the subset of districts for which I have more current estimates of teacher unionization -using the SASS data as I described earlier -I find the same pattern. Those results are set out in column (5). 37 Specifically, the districts where more teachers are in unions are those where the switch to on-cycle elections had the largest impact, and the negative coefficient on the interaction term is 35 The unionization rate equals the total number of instructional employees who were members of an employee organization divided by full-time equivalent instructional employees in 1987. 36 Moreover, there is one district that strongly influences the estimated slope of the coefficient on the interaction term. When I exclude that district from the analysis, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term drops from -0.013 to -0.008. See online appendix. 37 There are 359 districts in this model: 51 treatment districts and 308 control districts. significant at the 10 percent level. Together, these results suggest that the districts with better organized teachers were disproportionately affected by the switch to on-cycle elections.
As an additional check on whether the negative effect is driven by the decreased influence of teachers, I use the original model to test whether the switch to on-cycle elections led to decreased school district spending on an item that teachers do not have a vested interest in expanding: general district administration. The dependent variable in column (6) of Table 4 is logged per pupil district expenditures on general administration, as reported by TEA actual financial reports. 38 Since teachers have little stake in increasing expenditures on general administration, we would not expect the switch to on-cycle elections to have an effect if it is indeed decreased teacher union influence that is at work. The result in column (6) least 174 districts had no choice but to move their elections to November of even-numbered years, the same time as presidential and gubernatorial elections. This was, no doubt, a massive change for those districts. Incumbent school trustees could expect more than twice as many voters to participate in future elections. I find that as soon as the joint election requirement was made clear to district officials, school trustees in the districts forced to on-cycle elections responded by granting smaller pay increases to teachers.
At first glance, 1.3 percent seems a small figure, definitely statistically significant but questionable in its substantive importance. Yet this is almost certainly an underestimate of the effect of on-cycle election timing on the relative influence of teachers in elections. As I described above, the election timing provision of HB 1 -which affected 20 percent of Texas school districts -only passed after multiple failed attempts by Republican state legislators to move all Texas school trustee elections to November of even-numbered years. Most of those bills were never considered in committee. The ones that were considered in committee were vigorously opposed by Texas school boards and teacher unions. The repeated failure of those bills no doubt persuaded Republican legislators to water down the election timing provision so as to only affect a small number of districts, which the teacher unions did not openly oppose. It is possible, if not likely, that the teacher unions let the election timing provision pass because they anticipated that it would only change election timing in districts where it was least likely to make a difference to their influence. If so, then the estimates presented in Table 4 are lower bounds on the effect of on-cycle election timing on teacher union electoral influence. Had the change affected the remaining 80 percent of Texas districts, the estimated effect would likely be larger.
But it is important not to make too little of the -1.3 percent effect that I do estimate. To an individual teacher who makes $43,000 per year, the loss of $560 is a noticeable decrease. an amount that could either be reallocated within the districts or passed on to voters. In the context of Texas school district budgets, therefore, the consequences of forcing districts to switch from off-cycle to on-cycle school trustee elections are highly substantively significant.
Conclusion
A large fraction of the nation"s 500,000 elected officials are elected at times other than national Election Day, when few races are on the ballot and voter turnout is low. In this paper, I
have argued that the low voter turnout that accompanies these off-cycle elections creates an environment in which special interest groups have increased electoral influence. For interest groups that seek policies with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs and that are better organized than any competing group, I expect that off-cycle election timing works to their advantage: officials elected in off-cycle elections should make policies that are more favorable to those groups than officials elected in on-cycle elections.
To test the theory in a context where its prediction is clearest, I have leveraged a 2006
Texas law that forced several of the state"s school districts to combine their elections with state and national elections, while allowing others to retain their pre-existing off-cycle election schedules. The rule that the state legislature used to assign districts to different election timing conditions was objective, so that interest groups in the treated districts could not directly lobby for favorable election timing. Since I have examined districts within a single state as well as changes within districts over time, there is little cause for concern that omitted variables bias the estimates.
Using matching to achieve balance on district size, income, urbanicity, ethnic composition, and pretreatment salary, I have found that the rate of average teacher salary growth was approximately 0.75 percentage points lower after the policy intervention in districts that were forced to switch to on-cycle elections. Furthermore, by conducting a within-district analysis using fixed effects regression, I have found that treatment districts granted significantly smaller salary increases to teachers after the implementation of the new election timing law.
This change cannot be attributed to changes in district size, income, ethnicity, or teacher experience. The results are therefore strongly consistent with the hypothesis that on-cycle elections decreased the influence of the dominant interest group in the school board elections.
The results of this quasi-experiment are striking, especially considering that these are likely conservative estimates of the causal effect of election timing on policy. The analysis is not invulnerable to criticism, however. Without a district-level measure of the mobilization capacity of teachers and teacher unions -for which even poor measures are hard to come by -I am not well able to evaluate how the effect of the switch to on-cycle elections varies with interest group strength. Moreover, the assignment of districts to treatment and control conditions was not random, which leaves open the possibility that there is some time-variant characteristic of districts that confounds the estimate of the treatment effect.
The latter possibility, however, is unlikely. The conditions created by HB 1 allow for cleaner estimation than the vast majority of studies that use observational data. To the extent that the results are biased, they are most likely biased in a conservative direction. Furthermore, while interest group strength and election activity are extremely difficult to measure, the focus on school district elections limits the possible alternative explanations for the findings. School boards make decisions that directly affect the lives and livelihoods of teachers and other school employees, and thus teachers have a large personal stake in school district policy. Moreover, teachers are well organized and highly active in politics (e.g., Moe 2011); the extant literature has demonstrated that they tend to be the dominant interest group active in school board elections (e.g., Hess and Leal 2005) . This study shows that when school board elections are held at a time when voter turnout is high, school boards give smaller salary increases to teachers.
Moreover, the negative impact is greater in districts where teachers are better organized.
The results here also accord with those found in other studies. In an earlier paper, I used a cross-sectional design in eight states which showed that teacher salaries are 1.5 to 4.2 percent higher in districts that hold off-cycle elections, depending on the experience and education level of the teacher (Anzia 2011) . In a study of California districts, Berry and Gersen (2011) found a significant 1 percent effect by regressing log average teacher salary between 1999 and 2008 on an indicator for even-year elections and log teacher salary in 1987 -the year prior to when school districts were allowed to change their elections to on-cycle. 39 The Texas design I use in this paper finds similar effects but with an improved design -a design that leverages withindistrict changes in election timing, partials out potential time-constant sources of omitted variable bias, and reduces the possibility of selection bias.
While the empirical analysis of this paper has focused on school board elections, the potential implications of these findings for American government are far broader and open up a number of questions that are ripe for future research: What other organized groups benefit from 39 The instrumental variables regression in the Berry and Gersen study yields a null effect of election timing, but in analyzing the data from that article, I found that the instrument for on-cycle election timing predicts teacher salaries in 1987, even before districts were allowed to change their election schedules to on-cycle. This suggests that it is unlikely that the instrument"s effect on teacher salary works only through election timing. hold school trustee elections, and all type 1, 2, and 3 districts that I was unable to classify. (2) is the percentage of registered voters who voted in the school board election. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: I execute all matching using the Match function in the Matching package in R (Sekhon 2011) . I require exact matches on districts" Metro Status Codes (i.e., urban, urban fringe, and rural) and use a caliper of one-tenth of a standard deviation for logged 2005 enrollment and logged 2000 median family income. Panel 1 (All Districts) uses all the districts shaded in Figure  1 , i.e., both type 3 and type 4 districts in the treatment group and identified type 1 districts in the control group. Panel 2 (Matched Districts) includes matched districts only. Panel 3 presents the results excluding all type 3 districts from the matching procedure; it thus compares matched type 4 and type 1 districts. To achieve balance on the covariates in panel 3, I also matched on logged pretreatment salary and pretreatment growth using a caliper of 1. Models include district fixed effects. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
